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Sir,
The Kurds in Iraq have won the international community’s 
trust as they have been part of  the solution to the 
issues facing the region. Dissatisfied with Baghdad and 
overconfident that the regional countries will not backlash 
due to the referendum, the KRG proceeded with the 
referendum for independence in the Kurdistan region 
including the disputed areas. The KRG decision-makers 
were vigilant enough to avoid playing the nationalist card 
and make the case exclusively as a domestic affair. Neither 
neighboring countries, in which many Kurds are residents, 
nor the international community supported the referendum. 
In this article, I would like to bring certain aspects of  the 
Kurdistan Independence Referendum into a better light 
of  appreciation. It will be argued that it is not about the 
process rather the structure of  the international regime of  
recognition. The international community has opted for the 
already dysfunctional Iraq.
Iraqi Government enforced punitive measures against 
the Kurdistan Region as the Kurds in Iraq, frustrated by 
the federal government’s dysfunctionality, pushed for the 
referendum for independence on September 25, 2017. That 
was not something of  a surprise for the Kurds in Iraq and the 
wider Middle East. Cancellation of  the Severe Treaty of  1923, 
the overthrow of  the Ottmans by Kemal Ataturk, and Iran 
and Iraq’s refusal to include Kurds’ demand for statehood 
triggered a century-long instability in the region. Turkey, Iran, 
Syrian, and Iraq rarely find a mere common interest, but 
when it comes to halt Kurdish statehood aspirations in their 
respective countries, they all appear to be united. Saad Abad 
pact of  1937, Baghdad Pact of  1955, Algeria’s treaty of  1975, 
and a recent Kurdistan blockade are historical evidences.
The misperception by the governments of  these countries 
of  the KRG intentions would be a recipe for perpetual 
instability in Iraq and beyond. The KRG claims that Baghdad 
has failed to treat the Kurds as equal partners. Thus, no 
sign of  de-escalation of  the tension is evident between the 
KRG and the Iraq federal government in the foreseeable 
future. For instance, the new Iraq’s political structure of  
the post-Saddam regime allowed the KRG to legally engage 
in international relations for the first time. According to 
article 117 of  the Iraqi constitution, “The regions and 
governorates shall establish offices in the embassies and 
diplomatic missions, in order to follow up cultural, social, and 
developmental affairs.” Subsequently, the KRG formulated a 
foreign policy agenda that elevated the Kurds’ global status 
to unprecendeted hights. Baghdad has always been sceptical 
about the KRG’s foreign policy as a sub-state unit. Activism 
of  subnational entities in the international arena is known 
in literature as paradiplomacy. Iraq was afraid that the Kurds 
ultimately would pursue a secessionist form of  foreign policy. 
Bingol (2016) referred to it as protodiplomacy. The KRG 
referendum exacerbated the existing tension between both 
sides to a level that is widely believd to be obstinate.
Massud Barzani’s very last statement as president of  
Kurdistan was a reiteration of  historical distrust that 
exists in the Kurdish collective memory toward Baghdad. 
He highlighted that Baghdad does not believe in power 
sharing and partnership. On the contrary, he asserted that 
centralized policies which are against new Iraq’s federal, 
and democratic and pluralistic constitution is in practice. 
Before the referendum, the KRG reported 55 articles of  
Iraqi constitution not honored by the federal government, 
including provisions on revenue sharing and Article 140 
mandating the resolution of  the disputed territories problem.
The KRG’s September 25 referendum Tipped diplomatic 
support in favor of  Baghdad in a rather dramatic form. 
The main powers’ opposition, including the US, the KRG’s 
ally, and neighboring countries, towards the referendum 
Provided Baghdad with moral and diplomatic justifications. 
Seeing the very survival and autonomy of  the region 
in jeopardy, the KRG accepted Iraq’s conditions. In an 
interview to the Wall Street Journal, Falah Mustafa, head 
of  the KRG Department of  Foreign Relations, stated, “It 
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is not easy to hide my worries about perpetual hostilities 
between Baghdad and Erbil. Bagdad treats us not as a 
partner but as an opponent.”
Despite all this, the KRG has proven to be a trustable anchor 
for the regional stability. 25 years of  self-rule shows that the 
Kurds are pragmatic toward regional realities. According 
to Nechirvan Barzani, the KRG Prime Minter, “The 
government’s policy is to establish long-term relations with 
Iran and Turkey based on mutual respect and interest.” “We 
would like to be part of  the solution not the problem in the 
Middle East” being aware of  its limited options, and the KRG 
has opted for developing ties with Iran and Turkey. Playing 
a significant role in international coalition for fighting ISIS 
provided the KRG, a considerable diplomatic opportunity. 
The coalition forces treated the Kurdistan Region as a country 
accordingly as president has been received by the head of  
states. Believing that they play a major role in the balance of  
power in the region as a substate actor, and the Kurds wish for 
a scenario in which they could bandwagon with uper powers 
to gain even more autonomy in Iraq. IIraqi Kurds’ refrained 
from playing the nationalist card before the referendum, as 
the KRG understood a potential backlash from Turkey and 
Iran. Turkey and Iran fear of  domino effect as they perceived 
it an inspiration for their own Kurds to obtain more rights 
(Lundgren, 2007). Their steadfast cooperation against the 
KRG paid off. They collectively hindered the referendum and 
punished the KRG with diplomatic, economic, intelligence 
and military blockade.
The regional countries well understand that the Kurdistan 
Region is the terrestrial common denominator. To pursue a 
long-term agenda forward and guarantee boarder security, 
Turkey and Iran have to come down to a compromise towards 
the KRG. An instable Kurdistan Region within Iraq would 
negatively impact the security of  both countries as they share 
approximately one thousand kilometers of  boarder with 
the KRG. Knowing that the independence bid is temporary 
put off  they will certainly take steps to gradually normalize 
their cooperation with the KRG. Realpolitik is the main rule 
of  international relations when it comes to nations’ self-
determination. I am disappointed that oppressed nations 
have no friends,” Massud Barzani said in an interview to 
CNN.  The Kurd's aspirations for statehood have been in 
vain; in the words of  Bernard-Henri Lévy ‘Night has fallen 
onto Kurdistan.
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